000			02981cam a2200313 a 4500
008			930624s1980 ne |||| |||| 00||0|eng
020			_a9789027710161
020			_a9027710155
020			_a9789027710154
020			_a9027710163
020			_a9789400989474
060			_aZZ 1.
100	1		_aMaturana, Humberto R
245	1	0	_aAutopoiesis and cognition : _bthe realization of the living / _cHumberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela ; with a pref. to "Autopoiesis" by Stafford Beer. _h[E-book]
260			_aDordrecht, Holland : _bSpringer, _c1980.
300			_axxx, 141p.
490	1		_aBoston studies in the philosophy of science ; _vv. 42
500			_aIncludes index.
504			_aBibliography: p. 139-140.
505			_aTable Of Contents Front EDITORIAL PREFACE GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD INTRODUCTION BIOLOGY OF COGNITION TABLE OF CONTENTS III. COGNITIVE FUNCTION IV. COGNITIVE FUNCTION IN PARTICULAR V. PROBLEMS IN THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF COGNITION VI. CONCLUSIONS POST SCRIPTUM AUTOPOIESIS TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ON MACHINES, LIVING AND OTHERWISE DISPENSABILITY OF TELEONOMY EMBODIMENTS OF AUTOPOIESIS DIVERSITY OF AUTOPOIESIS PRESENCE OF AUTOPOIESIS APPENDIX GLOSSARY BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX OF NAMES BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
520			_aThis is a bold, brilliant, provocative and puzzling work. It demands a radical shift in standpoint, an almost paradoxical posture in which living systems are described in terms of what lies outside the domain of descriptions. Professor Humberto Maturana, with his colleague Francisco Varela, have undertaken the construction of a systematic theoretical biology which attempts to define living systems not as they are objects of observation and description, nor even as in­ teracting systems, but as self-contained unities whose only reference is to them­ selves. Thus, the standpoint of description of such unities from the 'outside', i. e. , by an observer, already seems to violate the fundamental requirement which Maturana and Varela posit for the characterization of such system- namely, that they are autonomous, self-referring and self-constructing closed systems - in short, autopoietic systems in their terms. Yet, on the basis of such a conceptual method, and such a theory of living systems, Maturana goes on to define cognition as a biological phenomenon; as, in effect, the very nature of all living systems. And on this basis, to generate the very domains of interac­ tion among such systems which constitute language, description and thinking.
650		2	_aBiology _95385
650		2	_aCognition
650		2	_aNature
700	1		_aVarela, Francisco J
830		0	_aBoston studies in the philosophy of science ; _vv. 42.
856			_uhttps://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/slamnhs/detail.action?docID=3108447 _ySouth London and Maudsley Trust staff and students click here for e-book access (NHS OpenAthens login required)
942			_n0
999			_c34437 _d34437